free jurisprudence essays

Campaign finance is again before the Supreme Court bench Imagine you want to run for office, say for a seat in the state legislature, and you are deciding whether to opt into a voluntary public financing system: accepting a pot of money from the government in exchange for giving up the right to raise funds from private individuals. If you opt in, you would be free from the burdens of fundraising, and the chances of corruption (or the appearance of corruption) would be minimized because you wouldn't be dependent on others to fund your campaign. But there's a danger: What if your opponent, or an outside group, is determined to spend lots of money against you? To deal with this problem, states like Arizona give you additional matching funds, to a point, to make it viable for publicly financed candidates like you to compete. On Monday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in McComish v. Bennett,a case from Arizona in which those wealthy opponents and outside groups have complained that this additional spending violates their First Amendment rights. And once again, just a year after the court in Citizens United   turned on the corporate-money spigot by allowing unlimited corporate spending in elections (and the FEC allowed corporations to hide much of their donations), the court appears poised to side with the wealthy in a campaign finance case. At first glance, the First Amendment complaint of the wealthy candidates and outside groups would seem to be at odds with the more speech is better mantra of the court in Citizens United. After all, Arizona imposes no limits on the spending of non-candidates or outside groups on election campaigns. What's the worst thing that can happen if a wealthy candidate spends gobs of cash running against a candidate who has opted into the public financing system? The publicly financed candidate gets more government dollars to.
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Apple Android Windows Phone Android Frequently Bought Together + Total price: .43 Add both to Cart Add both to List Buy the selected items togetherThis item:Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy by Brian Leiter Paperback .77.
One might pose the question: why should a legal system be morally neutral? Surely the enforcement of a particular society’s moral compass is the raison d’être of its framework of laws and judicial superstructure? Perhaps so in a broadly criminal context but perhaps not in every sense? Human behaviour embraces a certain moral perspective that is essentially private, carrying few if any exogenous consequences for the world at large. Mill on Individualism and Morality John Stuart Mill was a prominent and prolific nineteenth century economist and philosopher. It is submitted that of all his published work it was his essay On Liberty , published in 1859 that inspired most profound reaction and longest-lived controversy.  Mill’s primary assertion was that individuals should only be morally accountable to themselves, unless their actions touch deleteriously upon the interests of society at large. Mill’s thesis is that we should only seek to coerce others in self-defence - either to defend ourselves, or to shield others from harm. Since Mill’s influential and ground breaking work was published the freedom of the individual has come to the fore and has been advocated as an essential component of a sympathetic, equitable and advanced legal system. The Hart-Devlin debate The celebrated and much analysed Hart-Devlin debate on the legal enforcement of morality saw its origins in the publication of the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (hereafter referred to as the Wolfenden Report ). The Wolfenden Report was underpinned by a fundamental philosophical argument which was considered decisive and which was set out in paragraph 61: We have outlined the arguments against a change in the law, and we recognise their weight. We believe, however, that they have been met by the counter-arguments we have already advanced. There remains one additional.
The chapters in this book were written in the twenty-eight years following H. L. A. Hart's inaugural lecture in 1953 as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. Originally published in England, the United States, and elsewhere, in many different journals and books, these chapters cover a wide range of topics. They include Professor Hart's first attempt to demonstrate the relevance of linguistic philosophy to jurisprudence, and his first defence of the form of legal positivism later developed in his Concept of Law; his studies of the distinctive teaching of American and Scandinavian jurisprudence;. More The chapters in this book were written in the twenty-eight years following H. L. A. Hart's inaugural lecture in 1953 as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. Originally published in England, the United States, and elsewhere, in many different journals and books, these chapters cover a wide range of topics. They include Professor Hart's first attempt to demonstrate the relevance of linguistic philosophy to jurisprudence, and his first defence of the form of legal positivism later developed in his Concept of Law; his studies of the distinctive teaching of American and Scandinavian jurisprudence; a general survey of the problems of legal philosophy; and an examination of three different attempts to provide a foundation for basic human rights or liberties, and of the notion of ‘social solidarity’ as a justification for the enforcement of conventional morality. Five of the chapters are devoted to the work of Jhering, Kelsen, Holmes, and Lon Fuller. The final chapter brings a philosophical distinction to bear on the solution to a perplexity which has long plagued lawyers, concerning the notion of an attempt to commit a crime. The Introduction gives an account of the main influences on Professor Hart's work; considers the main criticisms of it; and identifies the points where.
Skip to main content by Pollock, Frederick, Sir, 1845-1937 Topics Spencer, Herbert, 1820-1903, Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, 121-180, Commercial law, Ethics, Law and ethics, Partnership, Jurisprudence, England -- Law, genealogy Copyright-evidence-operator scanner-liz-ridolfoCopyright-region USCopyright-evidence Evidence reported by scanner-liz-ridolfo for item essaysinjurispru00polluoft on February 14, 2007: no visible notice of copyright; stated date is 1882.Copyright-evidence-date 20070214192611Scanningcenter uoftMediatype textsIdentifier-access essaysinjurispru00polluoftImagecount 412Ppi 500Lcamid nullRcamid nullCamera 1DsOperator scanner-hera-kashmeri@.Scanner ias4Scandate 20070215141341Identifier-ark 20070228Filesxml Wed Mar 17 19:44:42 UTC 2010 SHOW MORE SHOW LESS Nature of jurisprudence, considered in relation to some recent contributions to legal science; Laws of nature and laws of man; Some defects of our commercial law; The law partnership in England; Employer's liability; Theory of persecution; Oath of allegiance; History of English law as a branch of politics; Science of case-law; Casuistry of common sense; Ethics and morals; Marcus Aurelius and the Stoic philosophy; Mr. Spencer's data of ethics Publisher London, Macmillan Pages 412 Possible copyright status NOT_IN_COPYRIGHT Language English Call number AEW-3136 Digitizing sponsor MSN Book contributor Robarts - University of Toronto Collection robarts; toronto Full catalog record MARCXML This book has an editable web page on Open Library. comment Reviews There are no reviews yet. Be the first one to write a review. SIMILAR ITEMS (based on metadata).
The notion of analytical jurisprudence (also called “positive law”) is merely one aspect of a wide range of legal theories that are evident throughout legal history, and in the contemporary legal system. Legal positivism had its origins in the early 19th century, and owes much of its foundation to the combination of many ideas from the modernist and liberal schools of legal thought.  This allowed for a movement away from natural law theory, especially at a common law level, and gave the opportunity to take a more scientific approach to the law ‘as it is’.  This approach was first taken by figures such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. However, the positive view of the law struggled to adapt to the 20th century legal system, and it was HLA Hart who redeveloped the concept of positive law in England in the 1960s. Legal positivism holds the belief that the law should remain separate from morals and other social factors (such as religion, etc), and thus the theory was that the law could have much more general application. This brief will consider the ideas of the founders of the school of analytical jurisprudence, and highlight the strict separation of law and morality that these theorists adopt in their approach to analysing the law (thus supporting Austin’s claim). It will explore the theories set out by Bentham, Austin and Hart, and consider them in the context of the modern law, and determine their validity in the contemporary context. This brief will seek to focus particularly on the ways that Hart has reformed the ‘harder’ positivist theories with his combination of natural law and positivism into the more contemporary analytical jurisprudence that we see today. As a result of this combination, there are often conflicts between Hart and Lon Fuller (a natural law theorist) due to the obvious differences that these two theories possess. These will be discussed in.